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An Estoppel Based Approach to Enforcing Corporate 
Environmental Responsibilities 
 
Daniel Attenborough 
 
Abstract – Within the regulatory space that exists at the intersection of UK company 
law and environmental regulation the business community has generated its own 
environmental governance initiative to address growing anxiety about companies’ 
externalised risk.  Yet there is currently nothing in law to prevent companies from 
frequently acting inconsistently with these voluntary unilateral assurances, which has 
led to widespread concern that environmental values are treated as merely 
instrumental to the dominant idea of achieving economic benefits for the company.  
This article examines a specific case for the legal facilitation of binding obligations 
owed to the environment, which require a company to make good on its previous 
commitments about environmental responsibility.  It seeks to demonstrate that this is 
possible through the common law doctrine of estoppel, which can be opened up to 
prevent a company from acting inconsistently with its previous statements or actions 
about the governance of environmental risk.   
 
 
A. INTRODUCTION 
  
There is little doubt that directors’ standards of loyalty in UK company law were 
traditionally owed to the company itself.
1
 Although there has been much discussion 
about what is meant by “the company”,2 it seems that the courts in general deferred to 
managerial discretion as to what was best considered to serve a company’s overall 
interests in any given instance.
3
 This administrative discretionary authority ensured 
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 See e.g. Peskin v Anderson [2000] EWCA Civ 326; Percival v Wright [1902] 2 Ch. 421.   
2
 Alan Dignam and John Lowry, Company Law (OUP 7
th
 edn, 2012) at 335; Dan Prentice, ‘Creditor’s 
Interests and Directors’ Duties’ (1990) 10 OJLS 265 at 273. 
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 See e.g. Andre Tunc, ‘The Judge and the Businessman’ (1986) 102 LQR 549.  
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that, contrary to popular belief, the directors and managers of large, public companies 
had no enforceable duty to maximise shareholder wealth.
4
 The logical inference is 
that the enduring and influential view of shareholder concerns and values being at the 
centre of managerial norms and practices was not generated by legal doctrine, but can 
be better explained through the demands of global financial markets.
5
 Nonetheless, 
the company law reform project that occurred at the turn of this century has now 
formally embraced and enshrined in statute a “private” economic understanding of the 
company, which privileges the exclusive interests of shareholders.
6
 This fits with a 
recurring theme in UK corporate governance, which is increasingly predicated upon a 
narrow view of the internal decision-making structures of companies, whereby 
managers are or should be formally accountable to shareholders alone.
7
 This 
cumulative legal emphasis is referred to in company law and practice as the so-called 
shareholder value or shareholder primacy principle.
8
 It typically denotes the corporate 
managerial standard of generating an optimal financial return from a company’s 
business for the main benefit of its shareholders, rather than to address other social 
and public concerns.
9
  
 
This is a compelling account of why the environmental interest has traditionally been 
given comparatively little formal recognition and certainly no substantive legal 
powers within the dominant private understanding of company law and corporate 
                                                        
4
 A narrow thread of case law seemingly equated the company’s interests with the current and future 
shareholders, but it is more accurate to conclude that English legal doctrine has never unequivocally 
embraced to shareholder primacy.  On this, see e.g. Simon Deakin, ‘The Coming Transformation of 
Shareholder Value’ (2005) 13 CG 11 at 11. 
5
 Marc Moore and Antoine Rebérioux, ‘Revitalising the institutional roots of Anglo-American 
corporate governance’ (2011) 40 Econ Soc 84 at 86. 
6
 s 172 of the Companies Act 2006.   
7
 John Armour, Simon Deakin, and Suzanne Konzelmann, ‘Shareholder primacy and the trajectory of 
UK corporate governance’ (2003) 41 BJIR 531 at 531. 
8
 See n 38 below. 
9
 Colin Mayer, ‘Corporate Governance, Competition and Performance’ (1997) 24 J L & Soc 152 at 
155. 
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governance.  It is commonly reasoned, instead, that in those instances where the 
pursuit of shareholder value produces negative externalities, “corrections” should be 
made not by reforming the fabric of company law itself but, instead, through 
alternative “public” environmental regulation.10 This has been an important reason 
why regulatory regimes aimed at environmental protection were developed.
11
 
Certainly, when we look inside the rules and structures of UK environmental law, we 
see very clearly that it is an extensive mixture of more traditional forms of statutory 
precepts, but also an increasing focus on decentred forms of voluntary regulation and 
co-operative governance approaches to environmental protection.  In addition, 
environmental law, and the underlying philosophy of the instruments that have been 
relied upon, is engaged in a symbiotic exchange of ideas and pursuits with company 
law rule making and corporate culture.  This suggests an environmental liability 
regime that has the potential to re-balance the obligations and powers of companies, 
but also to influence the way in which these business enterprises define and prioritise 
their responsibilities.  However, it is submitted that, for a number of reasons, 
environmental law and policy has achieved only limited developments and successes 
in displacing the dominant idea that corporate boards must and should base their 
actions on the exclusive interests of shareholders. 
 
While no attempt is made in this article to speak to the more broad and complex 
problems of the ideologically staid climate in company law or to expand the mandate 
                                                        
10
 Henry Hansmann and Reinier Kraakman, ‘The End of History for Corporate Law’ (2000) 89 Geo LJ 
439 at 442; Len Sealy, ‘Directors’ “Wider” Responsibilities – Problems Conceptual, Practical and 
Procedural’ (1987) 13 Mon LR 164 at 176.  This is not to suggest that there does not exist a continuing 
debate within company law in its attempt to internalise extensive, uncompensated costs on various non-
shareholder constituencies.  See e.g. John Parkinson, Corporate Power and Responsibility: Issues in 
the Theory of Company Law (Clarendon 1993) at 261. 
11
 Elizabeth Fisher, Bettina Lange, and Eloise Scotford, Environmental Law: Text, Cases and Materials 
(OUP 2013) at chapter 2.   
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of environmental law, an understanding of these legal domains does inform several of 
the points underlined.  In particular, it is important to identify the background state of 
legal normality against which economic concerns sit uneasily with environmental 
safeguards.  Moreover, an exposition and analysis of these two areas of law 
foregrounds the regulatory space that has in recent years given rise to the business 
community generating its own governance initiatives to address growing anxiety 
about the contribution of commercial actors toward environmental degradation and 
natural resource depletion.  In this regard, most large, modern companies now 
promulgate voluntary unilateral assurances about environmentally responsible 
behaviour, which take the form of environmental responsibility policies, sustainability 
reports, and internal ethics codes.
12
 In a practical sense, these self-regulatory products 
are undertaken by companies to demonstrate a societal commitment to protect the 
environment in their global operations.  On a philosophical level, they purport to 
mediate the broader, complex relationship between company law and private 
ordering, and environmental regulation and values.  In doing so, they highlight the 
structural necessity to the environmental relation of managerial norms in favour of 
balancing privatised gains and externalised risk to the natural world.  Yet in spite of 
clear promise, there is currently nothing in law to prevent companies from acting 
inconsistently with these voluntary unilateral assurances, which has led to widespread 
scepticism that environmental concerns or values are treated as merely instrumental to 
the overall objective of achieving economic benefits for the company.
13
  
 
                                                        
12
 On this, see e.g. Lisa Fairfax, ‘The Rhetoric of Corporate Law: The Impact of Stakeholder Rhetoric 
on Corporate Norms’ (2006) 31 J Corp L 675.   
13
 David Millon, ‘Two models of corporate social responsibility’ (2011) 46 Wake Forest L Rev 523 at 
533-535. 
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The purpose of this article is thus to provide a specific case for the facilitation of an 
enforceable legal right, in certain situations, to be conferred on the natural world, 
which will ensure that companies are more accountable for the environmental 
statements or actions when no such obligation exists within formal areas of law.  It 
examines the compelling case for deploying the doctrine of estoppel, which is a legal 
principle in common law legal systems whereby a person is precluded from asserting 
something contrary to what is implied by a previous action or statement of that 
person.  The article argues that if a company has produced statements or actions about 
the governance of environmental risk, and this can be reasonably taken to have 
induced reliance and expectation, then that company should be “estopped” from 
defaulting on its commitment.  On a more general level, it is hoped that the article 
will further frame our understanding of what private law can in fact do to 
fundamentally interact with regulation relating to environmental issues in a way that 
is currently missing.  This could come at no more an urgent time than now, when 
there is a pressing need for workable and sustainable solutions to environmental 
inequality in corporate decision-making.  It is of course recognised that doubts might 
exist as to whether the environment itself is readily or plausibly capable of being a 
rights holder.  This point warrants consideration and it will be addressed in some 
detail later in the article.
14
 
 
The rest of the article proceeds as follows.  Part B provides an examination of the 
manner in which economic thinking has influenced the trajectory of UK company 
law.  The sources and contours of this discussion are set out in broad terms, and only 
to the extent necessary to illustrate the point that the exclusive interests of 
                                                        
14
 See the text accompanying notes 89-101 below. 
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shareholders are internalised within corporate governance processes to the exclusion 
of pressing environmental concerns.  Part C provides a brief overview and analysis of 
UK environmental law in order to highlight the conceptual, intellectual, and practical 
challenges confronting public regulation of commercial actors that externalise 
environmental risk. Parts D and E seek to examine from a corrective justice 
perspective how the doctrine of estoppel can be used in certain situations to oblige a 
company to internalise environmental risk when it has provided voluntary unilateral 
commitments about environmental sustainability.  Part F offers some concluding 
remarks.  
 
B. THE CONTRACTARIAN INFLUENCE ON UK COMPANY LAW 
 
The courts have frequently asserted that directors are empowered agents of the 
company, with which they are situated in a fiduciary relationship.
15
 It is of course trite 
that, for over a century, companies have been regarded as having distinct juristic 
personality.
16
 In the fierce controversy over corporate personhood, however, one 
truism resounds through the literature: a company has ‘no soul to be damned and no 
body to be kicked.’17 This has generated problems of accountability of corporate 
boards in company law and scholarship.  The practical response from UK company 
law and policy, and many other jurisdictions inheriting British law, has been to use 
                                                        
15
 Re City Fire Equitable Fire Insurance Co [1925] Ch 407, 426. 
16
 Salomon v A Salomon & Co Ltd [1897] AC 22.  Of course, one should bear in mind that the Lords’ 
unanimous ruling was simply giving effect to the doctrine of corporate personality as enshrined in 
section 6 of the Companies Act 1862. 
17
 The quote is attributed to Baron Edward Thurlow, an eighteenth-century British lawyer and 
politician.  The quotation was given wide publicity by John Coffee Jr.’s influential article: ‘No Soul to 
Damn: No Body to Kick’: An Unscandalized Inquiry into the Problem of Corporate Punishment’ 
(1981) 79 Mich L Rev 386. 
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the economic logic and language of “agency”18 to justify the position of shareholders 
as de facto principal and monitor of the executive office-holders’ discretionary 
administrative power.
19
 Indeed, the law deploys multiple instruments to regulate and 
contain this managerial agency problem.  There are a number of important doctrinal 
rules that internalise the interests of shareholders within the boards’ managerial 
calculus.
20
 Broadly speaking, shareholders have ultimate and revocable constitutional 
prerogative to draft and amend the articles of association,
21
 and collective ex ante 
appointment
22
 and removal rights 
23
 that they are entitled to exercise over the board of 
directors.  Additionally, directors are now obliged under section 172 of the 
Companies Act 2006 merely to “have regard to”, amongst other factors, the interests 
of the environment while seeking to promote the success of the company for the 
benefit of its shareholders.
24
 Shareholders also have the limited right to remedy 
managerial misfeasance or malfeasance on an ex post facto basis in court,
25
 as well as 
the no frustration prohibition in the UK Takeover Code.
26
 The story of UK company 
                                                        
18
 The most influential paper in this movement was Michael Jensen and William Meckling, 
‘Managerial behaviour, agency costs and ownership structure’ (1976) 3 J Fin Econ 305. 
19
 Frank Easterbrook and Daniel Fischel, The Economic Structure of Corporate Law (HUP 1991) at 38, 
67-68; William Klein, ‘The Modern Business Organization: Bargaining Under Constraints’ (1982) 91 
Yale LJ 1521 at 1538-1540. 
20
 The literature on shareholder primacy is too voluminous to cite in its entirety.  Some useful examples 
include, Jonathan Macey, An Economic Analysis of the Various Rationales for Making Shareholders 
the Exclusive Beneficiaries of Corporate Fiduciary Duties’ (1991) 21 Stetson L Rev 23; Bernard Black 
and Reinier Kraakman, ‘A Self-enforcing Model of Corporate Law’ (1996) 109 Harv L Rev 1911; D. 
Gordon Smith, ‘The Shareholder Primacy Norm’ (1998) 23 J Corp L 277.  On two very different 
interpretations of shareholder primacy, one based around shareholder protection and the other centred 
on shareholder empowerment, see Lyman Johnson and David Millon, ‘Misreading the Williams Act’ 
(1989) 87 Mich L Rev 1862 at 1899-1907. 
21
 Sections 21 and 33 of the Companies Act 2006.   
22
 Art. 20 of Model Articles for Public Companies.   
23
 Section 168 of the Companies Act 2006.   
24
 Following extensive debate about this provision, the academic or practitioner consensus narrative 
suggests that it encapsulates a shareholder primacy approach, while the (unenforceable) social or public 
element of the duty is essentially ameliorative.  On this, see. e.g. Christopher Bruner, Corporate 
Governance in the Common Law World (CUP 2013) at 32-33; Marc Moore, Corporate Governance in 
the Shadow of the State (Hart, 2013) at 28 and 192-194; Daniel Attenborough, ‘The Neoliberal 
(Il)legitimacy of the Duty of Loyalty’ (2014) 65(4) NILQ 405 esp. at 418-427. 
25
 ss260-264 of the Companies Act 2006. 
26
 General Principle 3 and Rule 21 of the UK’s Takeover Code prevent the types of unilateral action 
that a listed company’s board of directors may take when subject to an actual or imminent unsolicited 
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law in the twentieth century and early twenty-first century is thus one of a narrow 
depiction of the internal decision-making structures of business organisations, 
whereby corporate officers and managers are in the ordinary course of business 
formally accountable to shareholders alone.   
 
The main driver of this relatively narrow focus of company law and practice, which 
we might trace back to the neoliberal revolution of the 1970s,
27
 has been the 
aforementioned invocation of neoclassical economic analysis in Anglo-American 
corporate legal scholarship and policy-making.  It was a discipline-shaping theoretical 
turn that effectively brought law and economics into the path of company and 
financial markets law.  At the heart of this doctrinal and normative analysis is a 
“contractarian” model of the company, and the rules related thereto, 28  which has 
resonated with the traditional legal virtues of conservatism and classical liberalism. 
The modern brand of contractarian theory was pioneered over several decades ago by 
the influential contributions of financial economists and company lawyers.
29
 In the 
fewest possible words, the theory frames the fundamental rules and structures of 
company law and corporate governance in “private” enabling or default terms,30 
                                                                                                                                                              
takeover bid.  On this no frustration prohibition see e.g. David Kershaw, ‘The Illusion of Importance: 
Reconsidering the UK’s Takeover Defence Prohibition’ (2007) 56(2) ICLQ 267. 
27
 For some useful works on neoliberalism, see Raymond Plant, The Neoliberal State (OUP 2010); 
David Harvey, A Brief History of Neoliberalism (OUP 2007); Noam Chomsky, Profit Over People: 
Neoliberalism and Global Order (Seven Stories Press 1998). 
28
 There are too many works in this genre to cite exhaustively.  For an overview, see e.g. Michael 
Whincop, ‘Painting the Corporate Cathedral: The Protection of Entitlements in Corporate Law’ (1999) 
19 OJLS 19 at 28; Stephen Bainbridge, ‘Community and Statism: A Conservative Contractarian 
Critique of Progressive Corporate Law Scholarship’ (1997) 82 Cornell L Rev 856 at 856. 
29
 See generally, Armen Alchian and Harold Demsetz, ‘Production, Information Costs and Economic 
Organizations’ (1972) 62 Am Econ Rev 777; Michael Jenson and Willaim Meckling, ‘Theory of the 
Firm: Managerial Behaviour, Agency Costs, and Ownership Structure’ (1976) 3 J Fin Econ 305; 
Eugene Fama, ‘Agency Problems and the Theory of the Firm’ (1980) 88 J Pol Econ 228; Frank 
Easterbrook and Daniel Fischel, ‘The Corporate Contract’ (1989) 89 Colum L Rev 1416; and 
Easterbrook and Fischel, above n 19. 
30
 On the categorisation of legal rules, see Melvin Eisenberg, ‘The Structure of Corporation Law’ 
(1989) 89 Colum L Rev 1461. 
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which implies that company law is essentially a derivative of contract law.
31
 The 
institutional competence of “legal positivist” ideas of law as mandated by the state or 
the courts are highly circumscribed due to the purportedly rent seeking, inefficient 
and restrictive effects on business.
32
 In place of such regulatory instruments, 
neoclassical economics, and especially its new institutional branch, idealises the self-
regulatory capability of the market to endogenously produce and enforce rules to 
govern corporate activities.
33
 The “market” in this context refers to an efficient 
process of private bargaining between a collection of autonomous and rational 
individuals adapting themselves to circumstances, and it is this cooperation and 
conflict that determines the substantive content of company law rules.  When the 
presence of constitutive legal rules and structures is irrefutable, contractarian theory 
usually infuses formal law with a ‘passive-instrumental’ 34  quality, whereby 
mandatory legal rules are viewed as “standard-form terms” that would otherwise tend 
to evolve were the costs of making adequate provision for all possible contingencies 
sufficiently low.
35
  
 
                                                        
31
 Easterbrook and Fischel, above n 19 at 166.  On the counter-intuitive claim that company law may 
be trivial, see Bernard Black, ‘Is Corporate Law Trivial? A Political and Economic Analysis’ (1990) 84 
NWULR 542; Roberta Romano, ‘Answering the Wrong Question: The Tenuous Case for Mandatory 
Corporate Laws’ (1989) 89 Colum L Rev 1599. 
32
 On the limits of conventional law and regulation, see Dan Awrey, William Blair and David Kershaw, 
‘Between Law and Markets: Is There a Role For Culture and Ethics in Financial Regulation?’ (2013) 
38 Del J Corp L 191 at 198-205. 
33
 The classic accounts of Hayek’s distinction between constructed legal rules and de-centralised law 
are: Friedrich Hayek, Law, Legislation and Liberty (Routledge 1973) esp. at 72-91; Friedrich Hayek, 
The Road to Serfdom (Routledge 1944) esp. at 75-90. 
34
 Marc Moore, ‘Private Ordering and Public Policy: The Paradoxical Foundations of Corporate 
Contractarianism’ (2014) 34(3) OJLS 693 at 700.  For a US perspective, see e.g. Robert Thompson, 
‘Corporate Law Criteria: Law’s Relation to Private Ordering’ (2005) 2(1) Berkeley Bus L J 97 at 98. 
35
 Easterbrook and Fischel, above n 29 at 1428.  See also, Richard Posner and Andrew Rosenfeld, 
‘Impossibility and Related Doctrines in Contract Law: An Economic Analysis’ (1977) 6 J Leg Stud 83. 
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Based on the logic above, contractarian thinking disaggregates the existence of the 
company as a distinct legal institution into a market-directed bundle of contracts,
36
 
either express or implied,
37
 and these notional bargains consist of many different 
kinds of risks and opportunities that are voluntarily exchanged amongst rational and 
self-interested actors.
38
 Accordingly, every corporate actor is said to contribute 
enterprise-specific inputs (for example, equity, human capital, credit loan, custom) in 
exchange for receiving material benefits for themselves (such as, dividend, interest, 
price, wage).  This logic has opened the way for a divisive reinvention of the 
shareholder’s primary or exclusive status within company law and corporate 
governance.  From a contractual perspective, non-equity interests are theoretically 
able to bargain in advance, or re-negotiate along the way, for a specified economic 
return on their investments, whether in terms of a fixed wage or interest rate, and so 
on.  The shareholder, rather, is viewed as a “residual claimant” that has no fixed 
return from corporate activity, and thus ranks behind the satisfaction of all rights that 
other parties have contracted for in advance.
39
 This lower priority, risk bearing, and 
costs of monitoring management, in theory at least, mean that shareholders are 
collectively incentivised to demand additional legal protection and/or governance 
rights within the company to compensate for any downside and to encourage 
                                                        
36
 This is based on the view that debates about the personification of the corporate entity are 
preoccupied with abstract concepts rather than practical or concrete issues.  On this, see e.g. William 
Bratton, ‘The New Economic Theory of the Firm: Critical Perspectives from History’ (1989) 41 Stan L 
Rev 1471 esp. at 1493. 
37
 Easterbrook and Fischel, above n 29 at 1428-1429. 
38
 Daniel Fischel, ‘The Corporate Governance Movement’ (1982) 35(6) Vand L Rev 1259 at 1273.  For 
a general critique of economic rationality and its implications for the analysis of law, see Neil 
Duxbury, Patterns of American Jurisprudence (Clarendon Press 1997) at 364-381; Wanda Wiegers, 
‘Economic Analysis of Law and “Private Ordering”: A Feminist Critique’ (1992) 42 UTLJ 170. 
39
 See Easterbrook and Fischel, above n 29 at 1425, remarking that investors ‘bear the risk of failure… 
and receive the rewards of success.’ For criticism of the thesis that shareholders constitute residual 
claimants, see Lynn Stout, ‘Bad and Not-so-Bad Arguments for Shareholder Primacy’ (2002) 75 S Cal 
L Rev 1189 at 1193-1195.  On complete and incomplete contracting generally, see Simon Deakin and 
Alan Hughes, ‘Economic Efficiency and the Proceduralisation of Company Law’ [1999] CFILR 169 at 
177. 
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maximum corporate performance.
40
 While other corporate groups are implicitly 
prepared to concede structural protection and governance rights because of a pre-
established harmony between shareholder wealth and the long-term quantitative 
benefits for the company,
41
 the environment is not privy to this notional economic 
bargaining process.  Put simply, the natural world is not afforded any special 
governance rights or protections within the notional company, and the rules related 
thereto, not least because of the technical infeasibility of the environment being 
represented within any doctrinal or normative bargaining framework.  It is, instead, 
viewed as an extra-contractual externality for which environmental regulation, rather 
than private ordering, represents the only available means of protection.
42
   
 
It is fair to suggest that the ability of the contractarian approach to provide a complete 
account of the anatomy of company law is not without its opponents.
43
 The majority 
of opinions have expressed disagreement about the doctrinal significance of 
shareholder value,
44
 while others objected to the normative accent given to economic 
efficiency.
45
 Yet the fact remains that contractarian theory has been highly influential 
upon the fundamental and enduring debate as to how we should view the company,
46
 
and it has found favour in various significant policy-making discussions that go to the 
                                                        
40
 Easterbrook and Fischel, above n 19 at 91. 
41
 A point made famous by Milton Friedman ‘The Social Responsibility of Business is to Increase its 
Profits’ (1970) The New York Times Magazine. 
42
 See above n 10.   
43
 The classic critiques are Paddy Ireland, ‘Property and contract in contemporary corporate theory’ 
(2003) 23(3) LS 453; William Bratton, ‘The ‘‘Nexus-of Contracts’’ Corporation: A Critical Appraisal’ 
(1989) 74 Cornell L Rev 407. 
44
 See e.g. Gavin Kelly and John Parkinson, ‘The Conceptual Foundations of the Company: A Pluralist 
Approach’ (1998) CFILR 174.  For a US perspective, see Stout, above n 39. 
45
 See e.g. David Millon, ‘Theories of the Corporation’ (199) Duke L J 201; Lawrence Mitchell, ‘The 
Cult of Efficiency’ (1992) 71 Tex L Rev 217. 
46
 The origins of this debate can be found in the famous Berle-Dodd dialogue that unfolded during the 
1930s in the pages of the Harvard Law Review.  For a general background, see Joseph Weiner, ‘The 
Berle-Dodd Dialogue on the Concept of the Corporation’ (1964) 64(8) Colum L Rev 1458.   
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heart of UK company law and practice.
47
 Moreover, the rules of company law itself 
comprise many different elements that appear to give credence to a private contractual 
view of the company.  Most notably, the company’s articles of association contain 
primarily internal governance rules providing for its constitutional structure and 
distribution of power between the board and the shareholder body.  The rules set out 
in the corporate constitution are contractual terms upon which the shareholders agree 
to become associated with the company.
48
 Perhaps unsurprisingly UK law views the 
legal status of the constitution in contractual terms,
49
 and this conclusion resonates 
with a number of judicial pronouncements that ‘acknowledge contract as the 
animating force within company law.’50 Overall, then, the theoretical model that is 
generally posited by commentators attempting to understand company law from a 
private contractual perspective remains hugely significant in providing the 
discipline’s vantage point for understanding and assessing that law.   
 
C. THE LIMITATIONS OF ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND GOVERNANCE 
 
The previous section illustrated how a highly influential strand of company law 
theorising, which seeks to conceive of company law in private terms, not only colours 
the substance and interpretation of the law, but this framework also prioritises the 
values and concerns of shareholders at board and managerial levels.  It will be 
recalled that asserting the exclusive primacy of shareholders in company law does not 
                                                        
47
 Law Commission Consultation Paper, Corporate Directors (1997 LCCP No.153); Department of 
Trade and Industry (now the Department for Business, Innovation & Skills), Modern Company Law for 
a Competitive Economy: The Strategic Framework (London: DTI 1999) at para. 2.4. 
48
 s 33 of the Companies Act 2006.   
49
 See e.g. Hickman v Kent Romney Marsh Sheep-Breeders Association [1915] 1 Ch 881.  On this, see 
David Kershaw, Company Law in Context: Text and materials (OUP 2
nd
 edn. 2012) at 79-87. 
50
 Harry McVea, ‘Section 994 of the Companies Act 2006 and the Primacy of Contract’ (2012) 75(6) 
MLR 1123 at 1123.  For a representative authority see Fulham Football Club (1987) Ltd v Richards & 
Anor [2011] EWCA Civ 855.  On 22 February 2012 the Supreme Court refused permission to appeal 
the CA’s decision.   
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imply that the extra contractual values or concerns of the environment must or should 
go unprotected.  There is little doubt that virtually every sector of corporate activity 
across the globe, through capitalism’s need to proliferate and profit, is responsible for 
consuming significant amounts of finite resources and energy, and causing waste 
accumulation and resource degradation.
51
 The typical underlying normative claim 
from a law and economics perspective suggests that the only available means of 
protection lies outside company law, specifically within the domain of environmental 
law and policy.
52
 This has been an important determinant of the development of the 
UK environmental law framework.
53
 The purpose of this section is thus to examine 
and comment on the extent to which domestic environmental law regulates or 
contains the negative impacts of companies on the environment, particularly at board 
level, and whether companies are answerable for their decisions, practices, and 
outcomes in a way that is not presently conceived within the company law 
framework.  It does not offer a complete appraisal of UK environmental legislation, 
regulation and governance.  Rather, this section identifies and evaluates the dominant 
approach of this body of law, and the underlying philosophy of the instruments that 
have been relied upon, to achieve environmentally sound conduct of companies.  This 
is done only to the extent necessary to highlight the tensions within and shortcomings 
of traditional legal doctrine and more recent environmental governance arrangements 
that seek to regulate corporate enterprises.   
 
Because environmental law tends to operate in multi-jurisdictional frameworks, legal 
and regulatory initiatives in one jurisdiction are often directly and indirectly related to 
                                                        
51
 See e.g. Elisa Morgera, Corporate Accountability in International Environmental Law (OUP 2009) 
at Chapter 1.   
52
 See above n 10. 
53
 Fisher, et al, above n 11. 
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legal approaches in another.
54
 As a matter of fact, the UK environmental regime has 
been increasingly shaped by the extensive policy of the EU,
55
 which, in turn, is 
significantly intertwined with other international and national environmental 
policies.
56
 From its comparatively embryonic origins in the early 1970s,
57
 UK 
environmental law has come to assert a significant influence on the scope of corporate 
activities.  The dominant approach early on was to introduce innovative public law 
instruments designed to prohibit or limit environmentally harmful activities of large 
industries (e.g. pollution to air and water) by using a direct or command and control 
approach.  There have been a number of substantive environmental statutes over the 
course of this period,
58
 which in general achieved notable reductions of point-source 
pollution caused by large, homogenous industrial facilities operating within a single 
jurisdiction.
59
 However, command and control regulation has had many critics.  This 
has mainly emanated from within the field of neo-classical economics,
60
 which, it will 
be recalled, has also increasingly influenced the path of Anglo-American company 
law and scholarship.  Proponents of this approach suggest that the more complex the 
environmental problem (such as diffuse source pollution), the more obvious become 
the limitations, unfairness to business, and the inefficiencies of regulatory interference 
                                                        
54
 Elizabeth Fisher, Bettina Lange, Eloise Scotford, and Cinnamon Carlarne, ‘Maturity and 
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in addressing it.
61
 A large number of perspectives external to the economic analysis of 
law have also expressed disappointment about the incoherent fragmentation and 
complexity of much environmental legislation (and its administration).
62
 Others have 
expressed scepticism about a traditionally light-handed approach to public law 
enforcement intensity in many Anglo Saxon jurisdictions.
63
  
 
Due to these powerful political and economic priorities, the majority of which were 
driven by a considerable turn towards neoliberalism,
64
 UK environmental law during 
the late-1980s and onwards underwent substantial legal and regulatory 
transformation.  This saw a reorientation away from first generation public 
environmental law to a diversification of flexible and cost-effective soft and hard law 
governance arrangements.  In the neoliberal spirit of de-regulation and the sanctity of 
the market, meanwhile, government regulators have faced cutbacks to their power and 
budgets.  One principal line of reinvention has been a ‘reprivatisation’65 of significant 
aspects of environmental law, by installing new legal rules and structures to allow and 
encourage companies’ voluntary self-regulation, collaborative governance, and the 
use of quasi-legal third parties (such as the Environment Agency, NGOs, local 
government and EU authorities, Secretaries of State), as substitute regulators that 
assess the performance of private enterprises.
66
 This market-based or networked form 
of governance, which supplements more traditional forms of public legal control, is 
                                                        
61
 Gunningham, above n 59 at 183-184. 
62
 Eloise Scotford and Jonathan Robinson, ‘UK Environmental Legislation and Its Administration in 
2013 – Achievements, Challenges and Prospects’ (2013) 25(3) JEL 383 at 388-392. 
63
 Fisher, et al, above n 11 at chapter 3; Keith Hawkins, Environment and Enforcement (OUP 1984) 
esp. at XIV.  On the importance of enforcement intensity of the law, see John C. Coffee, Jr., ‘Law and 
the Market: The Impact of Enforcement’ (1997) 156 U Pa L Rev 229 at 233.  
64
 See above n 27.   
65
 Sanford Gaines and Cliona Kimber, ‘Redirecting Self-Regulation’ (2001) 13(2) JEL 157 at 157. 
66
 On this new governance form of regulation, see e.g. Gunningham, above n 59 at 184 et seq.  For a 
much broader perspective, see Sol Picciotto, ‘Constitutionalizing Multilevel Governance?’ (2008) 6(3) 
ICON 457. 
  16 
 
regarded as a practical approach based upon the overarching theory of ‘reflexive 
law’.67 At its heart, reflexive law seeks to mobilise ‘the self-referential capacities of 
social systems and institutions outside the legal system’68  to formulate individual 
companies’ response to complex social problems such as environmental protection.  
There are powerful economic arguments for the application of reflexive law strategies 
to environmental regulation, which fit with political theories rooted in autonomy and 
the promotion of individual freedom of choice – and importantly avoid the imposition 
of binding standards altogether.  The main practical applications of this approach in 
Europe, namely ecological auditing,
69
 voluntary environmental agreements,
70
 and 
emissions trading systems,
71
 are purported to connect environmental values and 
processes to UK boardroom culture, but also empower communities and enable 
markets to make informed judgments about corporate environmental performance.   
 
It is without doubt that the modern UK environmental framework is now a vast and 
complex mixture of established statutory precepts, sui generis reforms, non-legal 
regulatory techniques, and policy and legal norms from a range of different 
jurisdictions.  Inevitably, all initiatives have strengths and weaknesses, and none is 
likely to be entirely effective in constraining complex environmental problems.  
Nonetheless, on the basis of preliminary evidence the UK regulatory strategy has in 
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general achieved only marginal achievements in halting, or at least slowing, corporate 
divesting of environmental risk.  It is submitted that this is because of the increasingly 
heavy reliance on a diverse combination of regulatory and governance mechanisms, 
and in particular the political choice for their use, which suggests a co-operative 
overall goal with corporate activity and rule making.  But as it is currently formulated 
this collaborative reform project works only at the abstract level in which there is 
some form of parity in the simultaneous exchanges between environmental regulation 
and company law.  In practice, environmental law, as a discipline, is generally 
regarded as ‘a conceptual hybrid, straddling many fault likes, and presumed to have 
no philosophical underpinnings’.72 It is this incoherence and relative ‘immaturity’73 
that acts as an impediment to facilitating improved corporate decisions, practices, and 
outcomes within the economically-oriented and philosophically settled normative 
order of company law and corporate governance.  Similarly, proponents of reflexive 
law tend to overlook the difficulty a company might face in constructing a more 
socially acceptable frame of reference to internalise environmental values, which is 
necessarily external (because the natural environment is external) to a company’s 
more familiar conception of its private function in society.
74
 The broader point is that 
the shifts over the previous five decades from law, to decentred regulation (especially 
light handed regulation) and now, towards environmental governance have produced 
a co-opted form of rule making for some parts of the UK corporate landscape in 
which it is more like ‘asking the inmates to design, build and run the asylum.’75 
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D. RE-DEPLOYING CORPORATE ENVIRONMENTAL LANGUAGE 
 
It has quickly become clear that what shareholders own are shares in the company, 
which is a type of contract between the shareholder and the corporate entity that gives 
shareholders certain legal rights.  The dominant private conception of companies, and 
the law which regulates them and their operations, recognises an exclusive beneficial 
legal status of these rights.  Within this frame of reference, issues of protecting the 
commons and the public interest do not stand on an equal footing with the company’s 
shareholders; dealing with environmental problems is typically viewed as the preserve 
of environmental regulatory regimes.  There is little doubt that the conceptual and 
doctrinal relationship between environmental law, environmental problems, and 
company law is nuanced and multifarious.  Yet because of the ideological and 
practical tensions, and the additional weighting attached to economic concerns at the 
European and UK levels, environmental law in general operates at the margins of 
company law with its characteristic focus on private rights and relationships.  This 
unsatisfactory legal situation has created a regulatory space, against which business 
enterprises have in recent years endogenously produced environmental citizenship 
initiatives to address growing anxiety about the contribution of commercial actors 
toward environmental degradation and natural resource depletion.
76
 On a 
philosophical level, these self-regulatory governance arrangements purport to mediate 
the broader, complex relationship between company law and private ordering, and 
environmental regulation and values.  In doing so, they highlight the structural 
necessity to the environmental relation of managerial norms in favour of balancing 
privatised gains and externalised risk to the natural world.  However, it will be 
                                                        
76
 On this, see e.g. Fairfax, above n 12.   
  19 
 
expounded upon below that such endogenous corporate environmental responsibility 
initiatives are not without their difficulties.  If we recognise that the law must grow 
and develop in response to (indeed in anticipation of) evolving concepts and needs of 
modern society, then it becomes necessary to think about new modes of liabilities and 
responsibilities to help fill this regulatory space.  
 
Many companies based in the UK and elsewhere now formulate voluntary unilateral 
assurances about environmental standards
77
 to meet societal expectations about the 
obligations and liabilities of commercial actors in the modern era.
78
 This rich 
stakeholder language typically includes consideration of economic growth, 
environmental protection, and social equity in business planning and decision-
making.  In essence, it ranges from attempts to ‘gain or to extend legitimacy, to 
maintain its level of current legitimacy, or to repair or to defend its lost or threatened 
legitimacy.’79 Implicit in these assurances is a normative claim that companies, due to 
their hegemony as global institutions, have a role to play in protecting the natural 
world.  Accordingly, companies that produce voluntary unilateral assurance about the 
governance of environmental risk exhibit a commitment to issues and concerns 
beyond the basic tenets of profit making.  It has been remarked that these 
environmental citizenship initiatives appear in some cases to even surpass overtures 
directed at shareholders and profit maximisation.
80
 The apparent ubiquity of these 
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initiatives is a product of two concepts deeply rooted in Anglo-American economic 
history.
81
 The first is a mistrust of corporate power, which is a result of recent 
governance failures but traces back to the earliest forms of corporate structure.  Even 
then, companies were restricted to very few freedoms, and operated in the face of 
governmental antipathy.
82
 The second concept is rooted in the widespread belief that 
self-regulation within an industry is preferable to and more effective than legalistic 
strategies of corporate regulation.
83
 Any given company thus uses environmental 
dialogue to set out explicit or implicit social and ethical values and intentions in its 
conduct.  
 
In spite of the ubiquity of these lofty environmental ideals across the modern 
corporate landscape, there has been minimal effort to empirically examine whether, 
and to what extent, these voluntary unilateral assurances accurately reflect a 
company’s genuine efforts toward environmental sustainability.84 This is attributable 
to several factors, not least because of the significant scepticism that dismisses such 
initiatives as inconsequential speech or a device for humanising large, public 
companies.
85
 This widespread view is based on the notion that companies, or rather 
companies’ public relations apparatus, use intellectually fashionable, non-binding 
commitments to project a favourable public image and influence the long-term 
expectations of society, but without an intention for these environmental statements or 
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actions to reflect or shape actual corporate behaviour.
86
 A related point is that while 
these voluntary unilateral assurances address in specific or detailed terms the issue of 
administration, rarely is accountability mentioned in a similarly exhaustive manner.  
This is currently a significant obstacle to enforcement.  In the rare situations in which 
a company’s behaviour might be open to legal challenge, there is a suggestion that the 
judiciary are reluctant to use the common law to resolve environmental 
controversies.
87
 This translates into an absence of UK jurisprudence on the legal 
efficacy of these statements or actions, and even in the paucity of US authorities that 
have considered internal corporate ethics codes, the court has not fully articulated 
distinct legal principles or standards of behaviour.
88
 While many open issues and 
questions remain about the legal status of a company’s voluntary unilateral assurances 
about sustainable environmental performance, the next section will provide a practical 
first step in facilitating an enforceable legal right, in certain situations, to be conferred 
on the natural world, which will ensure that companies are more accountable for the 
environmental statements or actions being made.  In particular, it can be argued that 
the doctrine of estoppel is capable of being displaced from the realm of contract or 
equity and pressed into service in an emblematic, divisive area of commercial activity 
that is an important site for the decisions, practices, and outcomes of companies.     
 
E. AN ESTOPPEL BASED ENVIRONMENTAL ACTION 
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Before we discuss the proposed remedy it is important to say a few words about the 
question of whether, and to what extent, the environment itself is capable of being 
considered as a legal rights-holder.  Much ink has of course been spilled on this 
philosophical and practical issue.  This is ostensibly because granting certain legal 
entitlements to the environment necessarily endows it with legal personhood.  There 
is considerable support at first sight for the natural world to be regarded as a putative 
legal “thing”, which has intrinsic ethical or moral claims to legal rights.89 Yet the 
notion that the environment can have a legal, financial, or participatory role in the 
affairs of the company presents real-world difficulties.
90
 At the very least this is 
because the natural world is a site of multi-faceted elements, processes, and 
ecosystems, which, in their own right, are not straightforwardly translated into legal 
institutional design.
91
 Another impediment is that as a natural object the environment 
is incapable of having constitutional standing.
92
 Nonetheless, the paradigm debate 
above is premised upon a simplistic “post hoc fallacy”, which depicts legal 
personhood as an expression of some uniquely defining attribute of human nature.  
This reasoning lacks or elides the obvious point that that the legal person is not 
necessarily a natural person,
93
 and it suffers from intellectual myopia in being unable 
to see that such conceptions are already part of the law.
94
 This prompts two closely 
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related observations.
95
 The first is the doctrinal understanding that natural things have 
at some points, in some legal systems, been accorded legal status and, second, the 
normative claim that certain natural things in addition to humans should have legal 
standing.  These observations buttress our argument that the category of legal person 
can and should be extended to include the natural environment, which more plausibly 
connects it to legal rights-holding.   
 
As a functional compromise, it is likely that political or deliberative engagement by 
private environmental claimants might constitute a precondition for the enjoyment of 
these rights, but it is recognised that the ‘multiple, overlapping and often uncertain 
causes’ 96  of environmental problems are such that this claim cannot be made 
emphatically.
97
 Nevertheless, it is contended that just as legal guardians can represent 
the diverse and complex interests of human beings unable to represent themselves so, 
too, could ‘ecological citizens’ 98  represent on a case-by-case basis the diverse 
“interests” of the natural world in the face of actual or threatened environmental 
damage.
99
 Furthermore, existing regulatory responses to environmental problems rely 
upon comparable deliberative choices, which often need to be made on an individual 
basis and involve the exercise of considerable discretion by administrators.
100
 It is not 
unreasonable to suggest that environmental organisations, corporate watchdogs, local 
communities, and even governments, are capable of performing a similar function of 
information collection and organisation, receiving input from experts, communicating 
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with all parties involved in decision-making processes, and ongoing oversight of the 
legal complaint.  Beyond this, because constitutional standing is essentially derivative 
of the rights of the natural environment, it would require private environmental 
claimants to eschew human self-interested and economic preferences and, instead, 
point to “environmental” injury.101 The court could consider a claim, it is argued, 
provided that the request for action establishes in a plausible manner that 
environmental damage exists and is capable of remedial action.  This approach would 
necessarily produce the consequence that the environment itself would be the direct 
recipient of any outcome remedy from the court, although this does not preclude 
indirect benefits to peoples or communities affected by the environmental 
controversy.   
 
Turning to the substance of the remedy, one of the most vibrant doctrines in recent 
years under UK law
102
 has been the equitable principle of estoppel.
103
 Amongst the 
dense milieu of disorderly origins and inconsistent rules,
104
 there are several varieties 
of estoppel in English law,
105
 and a debate exists as to whether most, if not all, are 
species of the same genus, or should be regarded as so different in principle as to be 
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wholly independent.
106
 The minutiae of that question are outside the scope of this 
inquiry, but we can identify in broad terms a common basis underlying the varieties of 
estoppel, which is explained by the very raison d'être of the doctrine.  It is, in 
essence, a judicial remedy that stems from the basic moral idea for achieving 
consistency;
107
 historical precedent clearly establishes that when a party to a legal 
controversy whose words or conduct have induced another to believe in a particular 
state of affairs, he or she may be precluded from attempting to act inconsistently with 
the assumptions thereby engendered when it would be unfair or unconscionable to do 
so.
108
 The rights of the parties are then determined by reference to the assumed state 
of affairs.  Therefore, estoppel precludes a party from asserting something contrary to 
what was implied by their previous statements or actions.  In its classical form, the 
remedy is a powerful one and may often be dispositive of the substantive outcome of 
the dispute.  Although estoppel does rest on certain basic factual elements in any 
given case, as a discretionary equitable remedy it is by its nature an astonishingly 
versatile device, not subject to overly restrictive rules that would diminish its 
effectiveness.  Indeed, few doctrines are so ‘potentially fruitful’,109 and while estoppel 
is ‘more often cited than applied, and more often applied than understood’,110 it is the 
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coherent medium through which non-contractual expectations are fulfilled, either 
wholly or in part.
111
  
 
When evaluating whether a company’s voluntary unilateral assurances about 
environmental goals and responsibilities constitute a suitable basis for an estoppel, 
three practical elements would need to be established: that an assurance or 
representation was made; whether this can be reasonably taken to induce reliance 
(usually in the form of an expectation); and that it would be unfair or unconscionable 
if the company acted inconsistently with its assurance.
112
 These requirements in 
respect to a company and the natural world are considered in more detail below, but 
while they are discussed separately for ease of analysis, it is important to understand 
that each of the requirements may, to some extent, influence the other.
113
 The first 
condition for estoppel is that an assurance or declaration must have been made.  At a 
very general level it can be said that, since an assurance is a positive declaration 
intended to generate an expectation about a particular state of affairs, it must involve 
effective communication.  The courts have been prepared to recognise a wide range of 
communication methods to assess whether or not an assurance has been made.  This 
includes the use of words, behaviour, or silence; grammatically it must take the form 
of a sufficiently clear and unambiguous assertion
114
 about past, present, or future 
situations.  This can relate to any subject matter, whether constituting objective fact or 
intention, and which can be reasonably taken to produce confidence in the 
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declaration.
115
 While there has been much academic and practitioner fervour 
preoccupied with the conventional distinctions between types of assurance, a 
persuasive strand of recent thinking suggests that we should abandon the notion that 
estoppel is dependent upon a particular form of assurance, and focus on the fact that 
an expectation interest has arisen.
116
 This means the focus of the law is not necessarily 
upon the form of voluntary unilateral assurance by a company, but instead centres on 
the effect of words, or conduct, upon the commons and the public interest. 
 
This prompts the question of whether a company’s voluntary unilateral assurances can 
in fact constitute an effective representation that is capable of being reasonably 
understood in a particular sense and under normal circumstances induces an 
expectation that a certain state of affairs exists.  It is trite that assurances in estoppel 
and contractual offers must in general satisfy the requirement of certainty.  Yet it is 
also true that under estoppel the court is exercising an equitable jurisdiction and thus 
is not restricted to the same rigid conditions of form.
117
 The classic test of an effective 
assurance in estoppel is that it must be ‘clear enough’118 to produce an expectation 
that can be ascertained and described.  In other words a company’s environmental 
citizenship dialogue would not to be held to something that might be interpreted 
perversely or speculatively.
119
 While a mixture of different interpretations might exist, 
it will not preclude an expectation from arising, provided that one of these meanings 
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can be reasonably taken to have induced the belief.
120
 The burden would then be on a 
company, in order to escape liability, to establish that the expectation in question 
would have arisen regardless of the company’s voluntary unilateral assurances about 
environmental sustainability.
121
 
 
To throw light on this point, let us take the example of two companies listed on the 
London Stock Exchange, which have produced archetypal statements about various 
environmental goals and responsibilities.  The multinational mining company, Anglo-
American plc, is the first example of a business that produces fulsome environmental 
communications.  Its website asserts that the company is ‘recycling and purifying the 
water [it uses] and bringing it to communities where it’s scarce’ before going on to 
proclaim that it is ‘helping preserve access rights and water quality of communities 
wherever [the company] operates.’122 In addition to an annual report,123 the company 
produces a Sustainable Development report.
124
 This document declares that it 
‘work[s] with host communities to help… protect scarce resources like land and 
water’125 and to achieve this objective it ‘employ[s] the “avoid, minimise, mitigate” 
hierarchy of controls to decrease… water consumption, reduce the potential impact 
[the business has] on water quality and eliminate water-related environmental 
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incidents.’126 The UK telecommunications multinational, Vodafone plc, provides a 
second typical example of these voluntary unilateral assurances, which are set out in a 
sustainability section on its website
127
 and a Sustainability report.
128
 The report states 
the company ‘minimalise[s] the environmental footprint of [its] operations to 
[facilitate] less energy, less carbon, less waste and less use of resources.’129 It goes on 
to commit to ‘recycle the majority of [the business’] network waste’ and in the 
challenging conditions of emerging markets with limited facilities to recycle and 
manage electronic waste Vodafone insists that it works actively ‘to ensure network 
waste is disposed of responsibly’. 130  Overall, when a company has produced 
statements or actions similar to the examples above, it is submitted that it could 
satisfy the requirement of being sufficiently clear and straightforward dialogue.  In a 
number of situations, this in turn could reasonably produce or reinforce a non-
contractual expectation about a particular state of affairs, such as a belief that the 
company has made a commitment to preserving water quality or proper handling, 
recycling, and disposing of waste.  
 
The second condition for estoppel is that a company’s voluntary unilateral assurance 
needs to be the kind of material communication that can be reasonably taken to have 
induced reliance on a particular expectation about the company’s governance of 
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environmental risk.
131
 It will be recalled, meanwhile, that a frequent criticism of 
corporate environmental citizenship is the perception that a company might intend 
only for its statements or actions to be mere “green-washing” or “window-
dressing”. 132  The intention of a company is brought into sharp focus, and the 
jurisprudence suggests this is to be objectively assessed.  To give an example, Coca-
Cola HBC plc purports to ‘[minimise its] environmental impact [as] a core target’,133 
honouring a ‘commitment to reduce, recycle and replenish water [it uses]’,134 and 
‘improving [its] energy efficiency, switching to cleaner energy sources and 
developing low-carbon technologies.’135 However, Coca-Cola HBC might not in fact 
intend for this declaration to reflect corporate practice, which threatens the material 
quality of the assurance and thus the likelihood that it can reasonably be taken to have 
induced reliance.  Nonetheless, there is considerable judicial support for 
marginalising issues relating to the probity of an assurance, provided it is clear from 
other factors that it can be reasonably taken to have induced reliance on a particular 
expectation, and to permit the company to act inconsistently with this assumed state 
of affairs would be unconscionable.
136
 When we consider the environmental 
commitments of Anglo-American, Vodafone, and Coca-Cola HBC, it is submitted 
that the statements can be reasonably taken to induce reliance on a particular 
expectation about how these companies will operate.  To support this assertion, there 
is empirical evidence that demonstrates how companies acknowledge the social or 
public expectation for multinationals to operate responsibly in domestic and 
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international environmental matters.
137
 Moreover, these studies show that 
expectations were created, to a large extent, because of corporate policy statements 
and published internal practices about the governance of externalised risk.
138
   
 
The final element of a successful estoppel is the question of whether, and to what 
extent, it is unconscionable or unfair to act inconsistently with previous statements or 
actions.  Having evolved from a rigid nineteenth century formulation,
139
 the overall 
modern tendency of a wholly liberalised and equitable estoppel
140
 is the ability to 
defeat a broad category of unconscionable conduct by the ‘making good of a 
representation, where to do otherwise, would produce an inequitable result.’141 Few 
could doubt that the English courts have made very clear in all cases of estoppel the 
notion that unconscionability is central to the doctrine.
142
 This relates to the intrinsic 
jurisdiction to restrain injustice.  But the broad framing of unconscionability means 
that precise explanations of its centrality within the overall doctrine of estoppel, and 
thus its role within successful estoppels, is almost always hidden or half-articulated in 
the various judgments, particularly when compared to the treatment given to the more 
factual elements of assurance or expectation.
143
 However, there are two closely 
related principles relating to unconscionability, which provide an evaluative 
framework for assessing the court’s multi-faceted inquiry.  The first point is a simple 
one and depicts unconscionability as the going back on an assurance about formality; 
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this in turn justifies the discarding of formality rules that would otherwise apply.
144
 
This is likely to be established if a company’s voluntary unilateral assurance amounts 
to: (i) a ‘sufficiently precise’145 declaration about the company’s environmental goals 
and responsibilities, and; (ii) it can be reasonably taken to have produced an 
expectation that the company intends to act consistently with its commitments.  In 
essence, a company’s statements or actions to behave in a certain way in respect to 
environmental performance constitutes a non-contractual obligation, but to act 
inconsistently with this declaration partially leads to a presumption of 
unconscionability or unfairness.   
 
The second part of the court’s evaluative judgment about the existence of 
unconscionability is more complex, and relates to the issue of whether the assurance 
can reasonably be taken to have induced reliance or prompted a change of position.
146
 
As discussed above, a much-debated legal issue is whether, and to what extent, the 
natural world can be regarded as a putative legal “thing”, which is capable of having 
constitutional legal standing.
147
 This article submitted that the category of legal 
person could and should be extended to include the natural environment, which more 
plausibly connects it to legal rights-holding.   However, it does not follow that the 
environment can change position on the basis of a company’s statements or actions 
about sustainable environmental behaviour.  The functional solution offered submits 
that ecologically motivated citizens could represent the diverse “interests” of the 
natural world, and this is already the case in a number of instances.  Because this 
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constitutional standing would be essentially derivative of the rights of the natural 
environments, it requires ecological citizens to eschew human self-interested and 
economic preferences and, instead, point to “environmental” injury.  The estoppel 
jurisprudence suggests that there is no quantitative measure for the appropriate level 
or type of reliance; it often invokes expenditure of resources, or something 
immediately identified as a loss or unpleasant, but it is frequently much more nuanced 
than that.  Accordingly, local communities, such as people indigenous to the highland 
Chiapas region of Mesoamerica could point to the diminished purity of essential 
groundwater and springs in the area because of a reliance on the faith of corporate 
published policy statements pledging to reduce, recycle and replenish natural water 
supplies used in the process of its localised activities.
148
 It is equally conceivable that 
a conservation and sustainability NGO acting on behalf of the Riau Province, 
Sumatra, might identify net loss of the natural forest over a certain period of time,
149
 
despite placing trust in the statements or actions about sustainable environmental use 
of Southeast Asian pulp and paper companies that are the main driving force behind 
that deforestation.
150
 The upshot is that, in many cases of reliance, the position 
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alteration of the ecologically motivated citizens, based on a company’s assurances, 
often might be construed as forming the second aspect of unconscionability. 
 
Where all the elements necessary to give rise to an equitable estoppel have been 
established, the effect of an estoppel is said to be to confer an “equity” to remedy the 
legal controversy.  This raises two additional questions: namely, what is the extent of 
the “equity”, and what are the remedies for non-performance of voluntary unilateral 
assurance about the governance of environmental risk.
151
 In practice these questions 
tend to be conflated; but they will be addressed separately for ease of exposition.  The 
first inquiry is a straightforward one that can be answered summarily.  When a 
statement or action gives rise to an estoppel, the parties must be dealt with on the 
footing that the assurance is true.  But this pretence does not make it true, and it may 
be necessary for the company to do something further in order to bring that about.  It 
is trite that the effect of estoppel, in many of the cases, is to give rise to a binding 
obligation when no such obligation exists within formal areas of law.
152
 The court’s 
jurisdiction in this area is equitable and therefore flexible.  In legal terms 
discretionary remedialism does not seek to replace pre-existing formal law; instead it 
operates, in certain circumstances, ‘to do what is equitable in all the 
circumstances’.153 Therefore, an estoppel would operate in the context herein argued 
for to mitigate the harshness of, or act as an alternative to, traditional contractual legal 
doctrine.  In a very real sense, the doctrine of estoppel can operate to oblige a 
company, either prospectively or retrospectively, to act consistently with its 
statements or actions about environmental sustainability.  The point is that estoppel in 
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this context, as illustrated by the words of Lord Evershed, has the ‘somewhat 
qualified and negative characteristic; it [is] not so much to do justice, as to restrain 
injustice, i.e. to stop the unconscionable conduct of the [company] against whom 
equity [proceeds].’154 
 
Turning to the second question, although the court has considerable discretion in 
respect to the appropriate remedy in cases of estoppel, that discretion is not a 
‘completely unfettered’155 one and a ‘principled approach’156 is exercised.  In giving 
effect to the “equity” it is traditionally thought that there must be proportionality 
between the expectation and the detriment.
157
 For the purposes of achieving such 
proportionality regard must be given to the precision of the assurance, which can then 
help to ascribe the measure of expectation and reliance to the defendant.
158
 It should 
be noted, however, that there is no requirement that expectation or reliance take a 
particular form, and the current position is that it need not consist of quantifiable 
economic loss, which means that non-economic detriment to the environment will 
suffice.
159
 If we imagine specific and less specific assurances at opposite ends of a 
spectrum, when the assurance is indeterminate or provided with qualifications, then it 
will be more difficult to ascribe a proportionate degree of expectation and reliance to 
the defendant, which will of course limit the extent of relief granted.
160
 On the 
contrary, when an assurance amounts to a more certain statement about environmental 
responsibility then there is a higher likelihood of ascribing expectation and reliance to 
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the encouragement, or acquiescence, that the assurance must have provided.  The 
proportionate remedies available in corporate environmental cases would normally be 
an injunction to prevent or control any future unreasonable conduct, and orders of 
specific performance to correct past unreasonable harm to the environment.
161
 Where 
it cannot operate retroactively to make good past environmental defects, punitive or 
exemplary damages could be awarded directly to the environment to compensate for 
past unreasonable loss, which would also have the indirect advantage of deterring the 
delinquent company and others from engaging in such conduct that formed the basis 
of the litigation.
162
  
 
Drawing together this discussion on the valid application of estoppel to companies’ 
environmental statements or actions, it is significant and worth emphasising that the 
use of estoppel envisaged here does not facilitate the creation of a rule of law, and 
will not create new rights in all cases of environmental controversy.  For example, 
there are a slim number of companies that currently do not produce environmental 
citizenship dialogue.  Others issue highly abstract statements or actions, or offer 
assurances with significant qualifications, which might not be reasonably taken to 
induce reliance on them.  For the majority of companies that do produce more distinct 
voluntary unilateral assurances about environmentally responsible behaviour, the 
constituent elements of the doctrine of estoppel would need to be established in order 
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to provide a suitable basis for a claim to succeed.  When these conditions exist, the 
doctrine of estoppel, as a form of discretionary remedialism, permits the courts to 
award the appropriate remedy in the circumstances of each individual case.
163
 It will 
be remembered that corporate environmental dialogue is becoming increasingly 
ubiquitous, and formulated in order to bring about significant outcome-benefits (to the 
extent of being crucial to a company’s social or public “licence” to operate, even in 
the face of increased exposure to liability as is considered in this article) from society 
generally.
164
 In a world that is increasingly and ever more closely integrated, such 
corporate statements or actions are highly visible and thus can be said to target, and 
come to the attention of, almost all areas of the globe where the company operates.
165
 
In this regard, the application of a valid estoppel provides a practical first step in this 
specific challenge of addressing how companies might better conform to societal 
expectations based on the way they have held themselves out in respect of the 
governance of environmental risk. 
 
A related final point is that while there are limits to the substantive and structural 
aspects of private law,
166
 in a number of instances this branch of law is understood to 
operate as a successful mode of environmental protection.
167
 There are at least three 
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important arguments in support of private law doctrine and private law litigation.
168
 
First, private rights can be used to protect a broader range of concerns than public 
regulatory measures.  Second, there is a symbolic importance attached to private law 
actions, whereby mainstream law provides fundamental recognition of the 
apportionment of rights and remedies in relation to environmental protection.  Finally, 
private law actions provide a way to agitate for legal change on behalf of individual 
litigants in a way that does not depend upon a legislature or administrative body 
deciding to protect something. With this in mind, the doctrine of estoppel is already 
used extensively in UK law
169
 and, it is submitted, the internal flexibility
170
 and 
underlying emphasis on restraining injustice
171
 is conceptually relevant to the 
governance of corporate environmental risk.  If we look across the Atlantic, a useful 
point of reference is evident in a line of corporate law cases involving shareholders 
suing the directors.  Implicit in these authorities is the very logic of estoppel, which 
provides a compelling case that a board might be prohibited from acting 
inconsistently with its previous assurances to shareholders if it would be unfair or 
unconscionable to do so.
172
 Of course, an application of estoppel to environmental 
controversies presents a purely practical misalignment with its pre-existing use, but 
that could be remedied with a creative judicial application of the law.  Certainly, there 
is some acceptance amongst senior members of the judiciary that the courts ‘have a 
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vital role to play in the protection of the environment.’173 More broadly, the courts 
have been assessing the actions of directors and managers for many years and, as 
recognised elsewhere, they are now more adept at doing so than ever before.
174
   
 
F. CONCLUSION 
 
This article has mapped the significant, complex legal interactions between the 
doctrinal and normative order of modern UK company law and the extant 
environmental liability regime, tracking the path of this relationship to a background 
state of legal normality against which economic concerns sit uneasily with public 
safeguards for the natural world.  While no attempt has been made to speak to the 
more broad and complex problems of the ideologically staid climate in company law 
or to expand the mandate of environmental law, this article has demonstrated that the 
legal situation above has created a regulatory space.  Against this philosophical and 
practical divide, the business community has generated its own self-regulatory 
governance initiative to address growing anxiety about the contribution of 
commercial actors toward environmental degradation and natural resource depletion.  
This at first sight represents an attractive ideal that purports to instantiate a mixture of 
environmental goals and responsibilities, particularly at board level, in a way that is 
not adequately provided for within existing aspects of law.  Despite outward 
appearances, the article argues that such voluntary unilateral assurances about the 
governance of environmental risk lack binding legal force, and many open issues and 
questions remain about whether companies are answerable for their decisions, 
practices, and outcomes in this context.  To address this specific problem, it has 
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examined the case for the legal facilitation an enforceable right, in certain situations, 
to be conferred on the natural world, which will ensure that companies are more 
accountable for their environmental commitments when no such obligation exists 
within formal areas of law.  It sought to demonstrate that this is possible through the 
common law doctrine of estoppel, which can be opened up to prevent a company 
from acting inconsistently with its previous statements or actions about the 
governance of environmental risk.  It is hoped that the constitute elements and legal 
plausibility of this idea have been established, but of course the legal rules and 
nuances of implementing it in practice need to be more clearly defined in subsequent 
debate. 
